Abstract: Hurst and Lusardi (2004) recently challenged the long-standing belief that liquidity constraints are important causal determinants of entry into self-employment. They demonstrate that the oft-cited positive relationship between entry rates and assets is actually unchanging as assets increase from the 1st to the 95th percentile of the asset distribution, but rise drastically after this point. They also apply a new instrument, changes in house prices, for wealth in the entry equation, and show that instrumented wealth is not a significant determinant of entry. We reinvestigate these findings: first, we demonstrate that bifurcating the sample into workers who enter self-employment after job loss and those who do not reveals generally increasing entry rates through the wealth distribution in both subsamples. We argue that these two groups merit a separate analysis, because a careful examination of the entrepreneurial choice model of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) reveals that the two groups face different incentives, and thus have different solutions to the entrepreneurial decision. Second, we find evidence of a stronger relationship in the two subsamples between entrepreneurship and a different measure of wealth --net housing equity. Finally, we investigate new evidence from microdata composed of matched Current Population Surveys (1993Surveys ( -2004 to further study whether changes in housing prices affect self-employment entry. We find that housing appreciation measured at the MSA-level is a significantly positive determinant of entry into self-employment. Our estimates indicate that a 10 percent annual increase in housing equity increases the mean probability of entrepreneurship by roughly 20 percent and that the effect is not concentrated at the upper tail of the distribution.
Introduction
The relationship between wealth and business creation is one of the most important and well-studied questions in the rapidly expanding literature on entrepreneurship. Many studies document the positive relationship that exists between personal assets and the propensity to start a business, and interpret this result as providing evidence of the existence and importance of liquidity constraints. 1 The interpretation of the finding is important because of its implications for justifying the provision of government loans and guarantees, the long-standing debate over the nature of entrepreneurship, and the potential economic inefficiencies created by liquidity constraints. Recently, work by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) , however, challenges the liquidity constraint interpretation. They show that the positive relationship between asset levels and business entry rates is driven almost entirely by extremely wealthy individuals. In particular, estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) demonstrate that entry rates are virtually constant for individuals between the 1 st and 95 th percentiles of the asset distribution, but increase drastically for individuals above the 95 th percentile. The constancy of entry rates for the majority of the asset distribution is inconsistent with the emphasis placed in the previous literature on the importance on liquidity constraints. The authors conclude that even if some households are constrained from borrowing, such constraints are not empirically important in deterring the majority of small business formation in the United States.
1 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , Evans and Leighton (1989) , Meyer (1990) , Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) , Ohlsson (1996, 1998) , Bates (1997) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) , Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (1999) , Fairlie (1999) , Johansson (2000) , Taylor (2001) , Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2003) , Hurst and Lusardi (2004) , Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (2004) , Giannetti and Simonov (2004) , and Nykvist (2005) . 2 Knight (1921) argues that entrepreneurs generally self-finance and bear all of the risks because capital markets provide too little capital, whereas Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( , 1950 argues that modern capital markets generally allow the entrepreneur to find a capitalist to bear the risks (Evans and Jovanovic 1989) .
A closer examination of the PSID data, however, reveals a more complicated relationship between assets and business creation, and one that emphasizes the importance of liquidity constraints. Motivated by the finding in Farber (1999) of high entry rates by displaced workers into "alternative" work arrangements such as self-employment, we examine the relationship between wealth and business creation separately for job losers and non-job losers. Although we find that the Hurst and Lusardi result is evident for the pooled sample of individuals, the result is not as well supported for the separate subsamples of job losers and non-job losers. Using the theoretical model of entrepreneurial choice by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , we demonstrate that the two groups face different incentives, and thus have different solutions to the entrepreneurial decision. This is due to the fact that some job losers would not have otherwise become selfemployed had they not lost their jobs, opting for self-employment because of a negative shock to their career paths, wages and wealth. 3 Alternatively, non-displaced entrants into selfemployment were those who planned to ultimately own their own business, and become selfemployed at a time that accords with this plan. When we examine these two subsamples separately, we find evidence of generally increasing rates of entry into self-employment throughout the asset distribution.
Further investigation reveals that the constant business entry rates through most of the asset distribution documented by Hurst and Lusardi are due to the changing proportion of job losers at each asset level. In particular, we find that job losers who have high entry rates are disproportionately located at the bottom of the wealth distribution and non-job losers who have low entry rates are disproportionately located near the top of the wealth distribution. Another interesting finding is that the positive relationship between entry rates and wealth in the two subsamples is stronger and more significant when we expand the sample size by focusing on net housing equity as the measure of wealth.
Also, Hurst and Lusardi offer two potential explanations for the spike in entry rates at the 95 th percentile in wealth: first, high-asset households have been found to adopt a much greater tolerance for risk, and second, that entrepreneurship can be regarded as a luxury good. These explanations may account for part of the spike in entry rates, but we find evidence supporting a third potential explanation. The entry spike is primarily due to older job-losers who become selfemployed. These older, wealthy workers are likely to face limited options in wage and salary work following involuntary job loss leading to self-employment. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also critique the liquidity constraint hypothesis by using a new instrument for household wealth in this context --regional differences in unanticipated increases in housing equity --and find a small and statistically insignificant coefficient estimate on the instrumented level of household wealth in the business entry equation. We apply this approach to data from matched Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1994 to 2004, which include variation in unanticipated housing appreciation across a large number of metropolitan areas over a long period of time. Estimates from the CPS provide a different result than those from the PSID, which are based on less geographical variation and only one year. Housing appreciation is found to be a positive and statistically significant determinant of self-employment entry and the effect is not concentrated at the upper tail of the distribution.
A Short Discussion of a Model of Self-Employment Entry and Exit
A theoretical analysis of the choice to become self-employed has generally been based upon a comparison of potential earnings from wage and salary work and self-employment. A model by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 
where θ is entrepreneurial ability, f(.) is a production function whose only input is capital, ε is a random component to the production process, and k is the amount of capital purchased by the worker.
Since capital is purchased with assets there are three general solutions to the question of how the individual chooses to buy capital. First, the individual could buy no capital if θ is small (if it is below the interest rate, r). Second, the individual purchases the profit maximizing level of capital, k * , which satisfies the first-order condition θf '(k * ) = r, and k * rises with ability. Third, if k * is unattainable due to liquidity constraints, instead of choosing k * the worker chooses k' such that k' = L(A), where L(.) is a function that determines the maximum amount of liquidity the worker can obtain given his or her assets, A. In this case, k' < k * , so Y SE will not be maximized.
There are two key observations from this model that are relevant to this paper. The first is that because capital is purchased with assets, then the presence of liquidity constraints can discourage low-asset workers from entering self-employment. If liquidity-constrained individuals can only obtain sub-optimal earnings in self-employment, then many of these individuals will not enter self-employment (even though they might do so if their maximized earnings were available to them). Thus, the existence of increasing self-employment entry rates as assets rise is consistent with the existence of liquidity constraints.
The second observation from the model is that because entry is critically dependent upon an individual's relative earnings in both sectors, then job losers and non-job-losers may behave differently within this model. The reason for this is that an individual who has not lost his or her job has the following choice: remain in the wage and salary sector to earn Y W = w + rA, or move to the self-employment sector to earn Y SE = θf(k)ε + r(A-k). Potential earnings in the two sectors are thus dependent upon A and w. An equivalent job loser, though, faces this same decision with altered values of these two variables. Since this worker has lost seniority, firmspecific training and other job-related characteristics that raise his or her wage, job losers face a lower value of w if they seek re-employment in the wage and salary sector. 4 Also, since job losers are at least temporarily unemployed, displacement will also alter their assets, A. Overall, these two impacts will cause job losers to have a different solution to the Evans and Jovanovic model of entrepreneurial entry.
Specifically, assume that f(k) = k α , so that Y SE = θk α ε + r(A-k). In this case, a worker will enter self-employment if his or her entrepreneurial θ meets one of two classifications. First, if the individual is not liquidity constrained, then he or she will choose self-employment if:
Alternatively, a liquidity constrained individual will enter self-employment if:
Now consider this solution for workers who are and are not displaced. For a non-displaced worker with a wage of w and assets A, the decision to enter or not enter entrepreneurship is determined by the above conditions. For an equivalent worker with a wage of w and assets A who will be displaced from his job, the decision is more complicated. After displacement, the worker will not be able to obtain a wage of w, but w'< w because of the loss of tenure and firmspecific human capital. Also, a worker who starts with assets A but is displaced before he or she becomes self-employed may lose some of these assets during the period of unemployment replacing lost income. Since the available wage and salary sector wage rate, w, and assets, A, will be different for equivalent workers who are and are not displaced from their jobs, then conditions under which they enter self-employment for a given w and A will be fundamentally different for both groups, which implies that separate regressions should be estimated for each group. 6 In addition to collecting very detailed asset information in five 6 In both the 1984 and 1989 wave, if the value of a particular asset (such as a house, other real estate, or the value of a savings account) is unknown to the respondent, the survey then asks "…would it be worth more than $X?", where X was an arbitrary amount. This amount changed during the two surveys (it was adjusted upwards for 1989), but this change does not have an impact on our results.
Data Description for the PSID
year intervals (the 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999 waves), the 1984, 1989 and 1999 year, and those who do not become self-employed business owners. We follow the more common approach in the literature of analyzing entrants into self-employment instead of using household business ownership as in Hurst and Lusardi (2004) . Household business ownership captures ownership of businesses by any household member and includes side or small-scale businesses owned by wage/salary workers. Self-employed business owners are defined by their main job activity in the following analysis. Nevertheless, we replicate our results by analyzing entry into household business ownership and find similar main results. 8 We begin by pooling the entire sample in the first two columns of the Table, and the results attest to the general differences between the two groups. Clearly, the age and a general measure of education for the two sub-samples are quite similar, but they differ in their net worth.
We also consider two different measures for net worth: the first is the household's total assets, defined as sum of savings and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, IRAs, housing equity (defined as the reported house value minus the remaining mortgage), other real estate, and vehicles minus all debt. 9 The second measure considers only housing equity (defined, as before, as the difference between the self-reported house value and the remaining principal on the mortgage).
Unlike the other asset measures, this variable is collected every year by the PSID, and is useful because it constitutes a large proportion of the respondent's net worth. 10 Thus, it permits the analysis of the relationship between entry rates and a rough proxy for overall wealth in a larger sample.
Both measures are significantly higher for the sample who enter self-employment, which is a standard finding that has been pointed to in previous research as providing evidence of liquidity constraints. In the next four columns, we make the same comparison for the two subsamples discussed earlier: columns three and four compare entrants and non-entrants who did not experience job loss prior to entry, and columns five and six examine workers who experienced a job loss before entry. When comparing entrants to non-entrants, both subsamples demonstrate that entrants into self-employment have higher assets than non-entrants, and the job loss sample's entrants tend to be slightly older and better-educated than non-entrants. But, there are other important issues to note when examining the two subsamples. A primary point is that each subsample contains a significant number of entrants into self-employment, so both groups represent large constituencies in this sector. Also, there are significant differences in the characteristics of the two groups: job-losers tend to be younger, less-educated and less wealthy in comparison with non-job-losers. Lastly, the entry rate for job losers is approximately 7%, whereas only 3% for the non-job loser sample enters self-employment. These facts suggest that an analysis of the relationship between assets and entry into self-employment may require a separate consideration of each group.
Wealth and Entrepreneurship
Numerous previous studies using various methodologies, measures of assets and international microdata explore the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship. Most of these studies estimate the relationship by modeling the decision of non-business owners to switch into self-employment over a fixed period of time and generally find that asset levels (e.g.
net worth or asset income) measured in a given year are associated with a higher probability of entering self-employment by the following year. 11 We start by presenting some preliminary evidence from the PSID on the relationship between assets and business entry following this approach. Table 2 reports average entry rates for each asset category for the pooled sample, and both subsamples of workers. The first column of the Table uses the pooled sample, and is very similar to Hurst and Lusardi's evidence, which shows that entry into self-employment is almost identical across asset categories, except for individuals whose assets are in the 95 th percentile or above. 12 We see a jump of nearly 3 percentage points in entry rates when we compare this category to the 80 th to 95 th percentile group (which has virtually the same entry rate as any of the lower percentile groups). But, different patterns emerge when we consider the two sub-samples independently in columns two and three (see also Figure 1 ). The non-job-loss sample in column three generally exhibits gradually increasing entry rates as wealth increases, and there is less of a step up in entry rates for individuals with the highest level of wealth. In column two, the job-loss sample also generally exhibits increasing entry rates as assets increase, but there is a large jump in entry rates at the 95 th percentile. These results indicate that the jump in entry rates found for the pooled sample is being primarily driven by the job loser sample.
Further, it is also interesting to note that the unchanging entry rates for individuals at or below the 95 th percentile in the pooled sample is due to the changing frequencies of job losers as assets increase. The first row of this table includes individuals whose assets are at or below the 40 th percentile in the distribution for the pooled sample. But almost 60% of the job-loss sample falls into this category; this is not surprising, since Table 1 showed that the job-loss group had lower assets overall. However, this shows the relative preponderance of job losers in this asset category. Also, in rows 2 through 4, the relative frequency of job-losers in comparison with nonjob-losers decreases significantly. This is important because it is this changing relative frequency between the two samples that causes the pooled sample to exhibit a constant entry rate over this asset range, even though each sub-sample generally exhibits increasing entry rates as assets rise. Since entry rates are much higher for the job-loss sample than for the non-job-loss sample, and since both samples generally exhibit increasing entry rates, then a relative decrease in the frequency of job losers as assets rise causes the pooled entry rate to remain constant as assets increase. Overall, this evidence has important implications for an interpretation of the entry rate dynamics in the pooled sample. Although it is clear that there are unchanging entry rates in the pooled sample for most of the asset distribution, this is not true for the two subsamples we analyze. As such, it may not be appropriate to suggest that unchanging entry rates in the pooled sample are evidence against the significance of liquidity constraints, since the underlying sub-samples suggest otherwise.
As supporting evidence, Table 2A also presents evidence on entry rates, but instead of using assets as the determinant of wealth, we use net house values. This is a reasonably good measure of wealth, since net house values accounts for 60% of total assets, on average, for homeowners. The advantage of this measure is that this information is collected in almost all years of the PSID before 1993 (when job loss information is no longer collected). A disadvantage, however, is that there are wealthy non-home-owners in the sample. Using this measure of wealth, we now find a positive relationship even in the pooled sample (see also Figure 1A ). But, more importantly, we find stronger positive relationships between entry rates and net house values for both subsamples than when we used net worth as the measure of wealth.
The entry rate increases from 2.0 to 2.9 percent when net house values increase from the less than 20 th percentile group to the 80 th to 95 th percentile group. For job losers, the entry rate increases from 3.7 to 6.5 percent. The estimates also indicate the large jump in entry occurring at the 95 th percentile, but the jump is smaller. Overall, the estimates for net house values provide stronger evidence of a positive relationship between self-employment entry and wealth among non-job losers and job losers.
To consider the findings in Tables 2 and 2A in a regression context, Table 3 estimates logit entry regressions and uses different approaches to document the relationship between wealth and entry rates in the pooled sample and both subsamples. First, in columns one, four and seven, we regress an entry indicator variable on overall wealth for the pooled sample, and both sub-samples. In all three cases, there is a significant linear relationship between asset wealth and propensity to become self-employed (the p-values for these coefficients are displayed in the second-last row of the table), which is a well-established empirical fact. In columns two, five and eight, the same entry indicator is regressed on a set of indicator variables that account for the asset percentile categories used in Instead of using net worth, we use net house values as the measure of net worth in columns three, six and nine. Using this alternative measure, we find increasing entry rates throughout the wealth distribution even for the pooled sample. The larger sample sizes associated with this measure of wealth also results in the probability of becoming self-employed being significantly higher than the excluded category (1 st to 40 th percentile) for every asset category displayed in the table. For both the job loser and non-job loser subsamples, entry rates gradually increase as net house values rise, and for non-job losers entry rates are significantly higher than the excluded group (net house value is below the 40 th percentile) for all categories.
Although entry rates are not significantly higher than the excluded group for every category for job losers, the increasing pattern is evident. The use of net house values also confirms the finding that the jump in entry rates at the 95 th percentile in wealth is much larger for job losers than non-job losers.
The analysis of the relationship between net house equity and entry rates is further explored in Table 4 Similarly, for the job-loss sample, the entry probabilities rise as net housing equity increases from the lowest to the 40 th to 80 th percentile groups, but the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.
We also consider two other sets of regressions in Table 4 . First, in columns two, five and eight, we expand our sample to include the years 1979 to 1996. From 1994 to 1996, the PSID did not collect information on job loss, but does contain information on spells of unemployment.
Although this is not a perfect measure of involuntary job loss, it will capture some displaced workers. Results in columns three, six and nine are derived from the second sample we consider, which contains the years 1979 to 2001. Since the PSID began conducting interviews every two years after 1997, for 1997 and 1999, we define entrants as those who become self-employed in the following interview. The results from the two new samples we consider are generally in line with our findings in Table 3 , which suggest that entry rates are (in general) monotonically increasing for higher categories in the net housing equity distribution and that there is no significant increase entry rates for non-job-losers above the 95 th percentile of the net housing equity distribution.
A significant finding in the results that we have not directly addressed is the sharp rise in entry rates above the 95 th percentile in the asset distribution. Hurst and Lusardi suggested two potential reasons to account for this entry spike: first, they cited findings in Caroll (2002) and Charles and Hurst (2003) suggesting that extremely wealthy households have a much higher tolerance for risk than lower asset households, far more so than respondents in lower asset categories. Since self-employment is riskier than employment in the wage and salary sector, then high-asset households should be more likely to become self-employed. They also suggest that self-employment can be regarded as a kind of luxury good; therefore, as assets rise, there should be a corresponding (and disproportionately higher) increase in the propensity to become self-employed.
We offer an alternative explanation for this finding. Our evidence has demonstrated that only the job-loss subsample exhibits a sharp increase in entry rates, so we further develop this result by comparing the average age of each subsample by asset category in Table 5 to determine the characteristics of these wealthier job losers. The first column demonstrates that average age of all workers is increasing in our sample as assets increase, and the second column shows that this is also true for workers who entered self-employment in either 1985 or 1990. This is not surprising, since it takes time to accumulate assets, and the same is evident in the third column of the table, which uses only non-job-losers. But columns three and four include only the job loser sub-sample, and demonstrate that most job losers are in the lower portion of the asset distribution, since many of them are younger workers -much younger than the non-job-loss sample. But as assets increase for the job losers, their average age becomes similar to the nonjob-loser sample. In particular, column three shows that in the highest asset category (where we see the spike in entry rates) the job-loser sample is approximately 50 years old, and column four shows that self-employment entrants in this category were over 51 years of age, which is a little older than the non-job-loss sample for this asset category.
This result provides insight into the rationale for the entry spike among wealthier job losers. Many authors have written about the negative consequences of job loss for older workers (see McCall 1997 , Farber 2004 , and Chan and Stevens 1999 , 2001 for example). In particular,
Chan and Stevens have analyzed the increased propensity of older workers who suffer job loss to become retired, since they face worsened employment prospects in many respects after involuntary job loss. Specifically, older workers who search for a job in the wage and salary sector require significant search time. Also, if they are re-employed in this sector, their earnings losses (in comparison to the pre-displacement job) are quite large, and they tend to have a decreased attachment to the labor market due to fewer hours worked peer week, and a greater likelihood of working at a part-time job. As a result, the spike in entry rates may be attributable to the fact that with severely worsened wage-and-salary options, relatively older displaced workers may need to create employment for themselves, which can be accomplished in the selfemployment sector.
Self-Employment Entry and Endogeneity
The issue of endogeneity is important when analyzing the relationship between assets and entrepreneurship. The propensity to become self-employed has been shown to be positively related to initial asset levels, but it is difficult to make causal inferences about the relationship between these two variables because a household's asset accumulation may be related to its underlying entrepreneurial ability. 13 To address this concern, previous studies have attempted to find suitable instrumental variables or other proxies for wealth, such as inheritances, gifts, lottery winnings or insurance settlements, which are otherwise unrelated to the decision to become selfemployed. 14 Because inheritances and other unanticipated (or at least less-anticipated) lump sum payments are highly correlated with overall net worth, they have become popular in the analysis of entry into self-employment. They are also generally found to have a positive association with the probability of entering or being self-employed, which has been interpreted as providing evidence supporting the liquidity constraint hypothesis.
Using our sample from the PSID, we find a similar result that inheritances increase the probability of self-employment entry. We find positive and statistically significant coefficients on net worth instrumented by inheritances for the pooled, job loser and non-job loser samples.
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Thus, our main finding holds in the instrumental variables context. We find a positive relationship between the business entry probability and a more exogenous measure of wealth for both job losers and non-job losers. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) , however, point out that an inheritance may not be a random event, since the receipt of an inheritance may simply signal that the household comes from a wealthy family, which may be correlated with entrepreneurial ability. 16 Consistent with this argument, they find that both past and future inheritances yield 13 Bradford (2003) finds that entrepreneurs accumulate more wealth than wage/salary workers. 14 See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) , Fairlie (1999) , and Taylor (2001) for example. 15 Similar to previous studies, we find that the first-stage net worth regressions yield very high F-values for the inheritance variable. 16 Entrepreneurs may also simply inherit their businesses from previous family members. Estimates from the CBO, SSBF and SCF, however, indicate that very few businesses are inherited (1.6 percent to less than 4.0 percent) suggesting that this is not driving the positive relationship between future inheritances similar instrumental variable results, weakening the credibility of using inheritances as an instrument for wealth. But, it should be noted that this finding does not necessarily rule out the presence of liquidity constraints if family members serve as lenders of last resort to the entrepreneur. A potential business owner may be liquidity constrained in the absence of family assistance, but not constrained with it. This may be especially important in the case where a business owner could only become self-employed if a wealthy family member co-signed for a business loan. If this wealthy family member is also more likely to leave an inheritance then the finding of a positive coefficient on future inheritances would be consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints.
Housing Capital Gains
In either case, we want to explore alternative exogenous measures of wealth. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) provide an example of a new instrument in this context --gains in housing equity. 17 The efficacy of this new instrument is due to the fact that housing equity represents well over half of net worth for homeowners, and gains in this variable would represent a substantial change in net worth for individuals. In their work, Hurst and Lusardi estimate housing equity gains from a regression of changes in house prices from 1985Q1 to 1988Q4 on nine region dummies, initial levels and changes in economic indicators (state GDP per capita and unemployment rates), and demographic characteristics. The inclusion of growth rates in state GDP per capita and unemployment rates controls for differences in local economic growth which may be correlated with entrepreneurship. The regional dummies resulting from this regression and entrepreneurship (Fairlie and Robb 2006 (Engelhardt 1996 , Skinner 1996 , and Hurst and Stafford 2005 . In the second-stage regression for business entry, they find a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient estimate on the instrumented level of household wealth.
We expand on these findings in two ways. First, we note that identification using the PSID data relies on variation across only nine Census divisions in one year. Since analysis at this level may obscure underlying trends in smaller geographic regions, we further investigate the relationship between housing appreciation and entrepreneurship by using panel data created by matching consecutive years of the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files from 1994 to 2004. 18 The CPS panel data allow us to exploit the variation in housing equity across a large number of metropolitan areas over a long period of time. One limitation of these data, however, is that the CPS does not include a measure of net worth.
Instead, we include housing appreciation directly into the regression explaining entry into selfemployment. The finding by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) that households save almost 100 percent of their unanticipated gains in housing equity suggests that this may not be a serious problem for the analysis.
Second, because the ideal instrument would capture only changes in housing values that are completely unanticipated by the individual in addition to being uncorrelated with local economic growth, we consider whether housing appreciation is explained by any additional information. For instance, it may be the case that there are persistent trends in regional housing prices which pre-date the four-year period before the entrepreneurial decision is made. 19 In this case, the housing price changes would not be unanticipated by the individual, but would still be captured by the regional dummies. To address this issue a second set of regressions that modify the Hurst and Lusardi housing appreciation regression to also include MSA growth rates in housing prices over the previous four-year period.
To create a measure of housing appreciation net of changes in local economic conditions and other factors, we first regress four-year housing appreciation values by MSA on initial levels and growth rates in economic indicators (state-level GDP per capital and MSA-level unemployment rates), detailed demographic characteristics by MSA (race, gender, age, marital status, family size, education, family income, labor force participation), and year dummies.
MSA-level housing price data are obtained from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO). To create a measure of unanticipated housing appreciation, we also estimate a first-stage regression that includes the previous four-year housing appreciation as an additional control. The residuals from these first-stage regressions are then included in logit regressions for the probability of becoming a self-employed business owner. Table 6 reports marginal effects estimates from the second-stage entrepreneurship logits.
The coefficient on housing appreciation is positive and statistically significant. 20 The point estimate implies that a 10 percent annual increase in housing equity leads to a 0.46 percentage point increase in the probability that an individual starts a business in the following year. 21 This 19 We choose a four-year period to correspond to Hurst and Lusardi's use of regional house price appreciation between 1985Q1 to 1988Q4. 20 We estimate specifications that include residuals for housing appreciation across 9 regions and find small, statistically insignificant estimates in the second-stage entrepreneurship logits. 21 These results are not sensitive to the length of the time period used to measure housing capital gains. The coefficient estimates for three-year housing appreciation imply larger annual effects and the effect is large, representing roughly 20 percent of the mean probability of entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, when we switch to including housing appreciation that is unanticipated by the individual we find a very similar coefficient estimate, which is also statistically significant.
Separating our sample into job losers and non-job losers is not entirely possible with the CPS. In the CPS, we cannot identify individuals who were wage/salary workers at the first survey date then suffered a job loss and became self-employed by the second survey date.
Instead, we can only identify job losers who are unemployed at the exact time of the first survey by their reported reason for losing their job, which captures only a fraction of all job losers during the year. 22 Table 6 reports separate estimates for two groups: non-initially unemployed workers and initially unemployed workers. For the non-initially unemployed group, we find similar results --increases in housing prices lead to higher rates of self-employment entry.
Estimates for the initially unemployed worker sample, however, do not reveal a statistically significant relationship. In fact, the coefficient estimate is so imprecisely measured that we cannot rule out similar sized effects as those found for the pooled and non-initially unemployed
samples.
An important concern with these results is that the positive linear relationship may be driven by the upper tail of the distribution in gains in housing equity. To examine this question, we first estimate regressions with a 5 th order polynomial in housing equity gains. Instead of a convex relationship, we find an s-shaped relationship with the upper tail of the distribution flattening out and declining slightly. Furthermore, we find a stronger relationship between housing equity gains and entrepreneurship in the middle of the distribution than for the linear specification. At the middle of the distribution, we find an average derivative of 0.0162 coefficient estimates for five-year housing appreciation imply very similar annual effects. 22 This definition captures only about one quarter of all job losers based on estimates from the PSID. compared to 0.0098 in the linear specification suggesting that the effects of housing equity gains are not concentrated at the upper tail of the distribution.
To investigate this question more directly, Table 6 
Conclusion
The well-established positive relationship between assets and self-employment entry rates has been traditionally interpreted as evidence in favor of liquidity constraints, but recently this evidence has been reexamined by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) . They have noted that the positive relationship often cited in the data is actually due to a relatively unchanging entry rate for individuals with assets at or below the 95 th percentile, and then a large increase in entry rates for individuals above this point. They argue that this is inconsistent with the existence of liquidity constraints, because liquidity constraints should cause entry rates to be rising over the entire asset distribution.
In this paper, we corroborated Hurst and Lusardi's finding for a pooled sample of workers, but found different results when we separated our sample into job losers and non-job losers. The standard theoretical model of entry into self-employment implies that these two groups face different incentives, and thus different entrepreneurial choices. In particular, job loss can cause some displaced workers to enter self-employment who otherwise would have remained in the wage and salary sector. We found that entry rates generally increase as wealth rises for each subsample; the result of a constant entry rate in the pooled sample is only due to the changing frequency of job-losers (in comparison with non-job-losers) as assets rise. The positive relationship in the subsamples was even stronger when we focused on net house values as the measure of wealth. Furthermore, the spike in entry rates is due to a sharp increase in entry rates for wealthy job losers, who are on average 50 years old. Given the literature on the adverse consequences of job loss for older workers, the rise in entry rates for this group is attributable to the lack of attractive options in the wage and salary sector. Overall, we argue that entry rates in the two subsamples serve as evidence that is consistent with liquidity constraints being an important issue for individuals who are considering starting businesses.
We also attempted to address the issue of endogeneity by demonstrating that our results remain significant even after we use inheritances to instrument for assets in the pooled, job-loser and non-job-loser samples. Hurst and Lusardi objected to using this approach and instead use regional changes in housing prices as an instrument for household wealth. Expanding on this approach, we use the more detailed geographic and time variation available in the CPS and find new evidence suggesting that MSA-level unanticipated gains in housing prices are positively associated with self-employment entry. Our estimates from 254 MSAs and 9 time periods indicate that a 10 percent annual increase in housing prices leads to an increase in selfemployment entry rates of 20 percent. We also find that the positive relationship is not being driven by the upper tail of the housing appreciation distribution. Overall, these new findings on the relationship between housing appreciation and entrepreneurship from the CPS and those from the reinvestigation of the PSID data provide support for the liquidity constraint hypothesis. 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1990 years of the PSID. A respondent is considered to have entered self-employment if he or she is working in the wage and salary sector or is unemployed in 1984 and is self-employed in 1985. The reason that job loss in 1985 and 1990 is considered is that we wanted to use an estimate of asset wealth that was unchanged by job loss. As such, we considered individuals who had not been impact by job loss until the year after the asset measure was taken. A similar procedure is used for 1989 and 1990. The reason that 1984 and 1989 are used as the base years in this analysis is that the PSID only collects detailed information on assets every five years, starting in 1984. Unfortunately, the PSID does not collect information about job loss in 1994, so that year is not useful for this table. Also, 1999 collects information on assets and job loss, but the PSID didn't re-interview its respondents until 2001, so entry into self-employment after 1999 is difficult to discern from the data. Assets were calculated using the same definition of Hurst and Lusardi (2004) ; they are the sum of savings and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, IRAs, housing equity (defined as the reported house value minus the remaining mortgage), other real estate, and vehicles minus all debt. 1984-1985 and 1989-1990 by Pre-entry Asset Levels
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses, and column frequencies are listed in square brackets.
The sample was constructed from respondents between the age of 21 and 64 in the 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1990 years of the PSID. A respondent is considered to have entered self-employment if he or she is working in the wage and salary sector or is unemployed in 1984 and is self-employed in 1985. A similar procedure is used for and 1990 . The reason that 1984 are used as the base years in this analysis is that the PSID only collects detailed information on assets every five years, starting in 1984. Unfortunately, the PSID does not collect information about job loss in 1994, so that year is not useful for this table. Also, 1999 collects information on assets and job loss, but the PSID didn't re-interview its respondents until 2001, so entry into self-employment after 1999 is difficult to discern from the data. Assets were calculated using the same definition of Hurst and Lusardi (2004) Standard deviations are listed in parentheses, and column frequencies are listed in square brackets.
The sample was constructed from respondents between the age of 21 and 64 in the 1979 to 1993 years of the PSID. A respondent is considered to have entered self-employment if he or she is working in the wage and salary sector or is unemployed one year, and is self-employed in the next. The reason that these years are used in this analysis is that the PSID collects self-reported information about house value and remaining principle on the house's mortgage every year, but does not collect information about job loss after 1993, so later years are not useful for the analysis. Net house value was calculated using the reported house value minus the remaining mortgage. The regressions in this table use all the standard demographic controls (age, age squared, marital status, gender, gender interacted with marital status, and three educational dummy variables) as well as an indicator equal to one if the individual had been previously self-employed in the prior five years, or if the individual had been unemployed in the prior five years. The samples for the regression results in columns one, two, four and five are comprised from the 1984 and 1989 waves of the PSID, while the samples in columns three, six and nine are comprised of the 1979-1993 waves of the PSID. In all nine regressions, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are not self-employed in the survey year, and the dependent variable representing entry into self-employment is equal to one if the individual becomes self-employed in the following year, and zero otherwise. The regressions in columns 2,3,5,6,8 and 9 contained more than four indicators for net worth, but for brevity's sake, only the highest four categories were included; specifically, the excluded comparison group in columns 2,5 and 8 are individuals whose assets are in the 1 st to 10 th percentile of the asset distribution, and the comparison group in columns 3,6 and 9 are individuals whose house value is in the 1 st to 20 th percentile. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses, and column frequencies are listed in square brackets.
The sample was constructed from respondents between the age of 21 and 64 in the 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1990 years of the PSID. A respondent is considered to have entered self-employment if he or she is working in the wage and salary sector or is unemployed in 1984 and is self-employed in 1985. The reason that job loss in 1985 and 1990 is considered is that we wanted to use an estimate of asset wealth that was unchanged by job loss. As such, we considered individuals who had not been impact by job loss until the year after the asset measure was taken. A similar procedure is used for 1989 and 1990. Columns one, three and five analyze the age of respondents by asset category for all workers in the sample or subsample, whereas columns two, four and six only consider workers who enter self-employment.
The reason that 1984 and 1989 are used as the base years in this analysis is that the PSID only collects detailed information on assets every five years, starting in 1984. Unfortunately, the PSID does not collect information about job loss in 1994, so that year is not useful for this table. Also, 1999 collects information on assets and job loss, but the PSID didn't re-interview its respondents until 2001, so entry into self-employment after 1999 is difficult to discern from the data. Assets were calculated using the same definition of Hurst and Lusardi (2004) excluding 1994-95 and 1995-96) . In all regressions, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are not self-employed in the first survey year, and the dependent variable representing entry into self-employment is equal to one if the individual becomes self-employed in the following year, and zero otherwise. Housing appreciation is the residual from a regression of four-year MSA-level housing appreciation on MSA averages of race, gender, age, marital status, family size, education, family income, labor force participation, and unemployment, year dummies, state GDP per capita, and growth rates in MSA unemployment rates and state GDP per capita. The second panel uses previous 4-year housing appreciation as an addiitonal control in estimating the housing appreciation residual. Housing price data are from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO (excluding 1994-95 and 1995-96) . In all regressions, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are not self-employed in the first survey year, and the dependent variable representing entry into self-employment is equal to one if the individual becomes selfemployed in the following year, and zero otherwise. Housing appreciation is the residual from a regression of four-year MSA-level housing appreciation on MSA averages of race, gender, age, marital status, family size, education, family income, labor force participation, and unemployment, year dummies, state GDP per capita, and growth rates in MSA unemployment rates and state GDP per capita. The second set of regressions uses previous 4-year housing appreciation as an addiitonal control in estimating the housing appreciation residual. 
